to meet missile delivery and firing schedules imposed by the Commission. Moreover, both the REDSTONE and JUPITER programs would face stretch-outs. So the limitation, which would occasion a momentary savings, would, in the long run, prove to be quite costly. Intangibles such as lowered personnel morale and the possible loss of scientific momentum were other considerations to be coped with 48 . Subsequent to the Secretary's 13 August directive, literally thousands of pages were generated comparing the THOR and the JUPITER from every angle conceivable. Competition and feeling between the two development elements ran high, as, quite naturally, each felt that it had the better missile. The deadline of 15 September came and passed, and, in fact, the ad hoc committee was still deliberating when SPUTNIK I orbited the earth. This demonstration was the overriding factor in choosing two IRBM's instead of one. On 10 October, the President approved the Secretary's recommendation for the rapid development for both missiles. And, in short order, the Secretary of Defense directed that AFBMD cooperate with ABMA in the full development of the JUPITER system 49 . The administration and coordination bog had been dredged: the termination threat had subsided in a beep. _____________________________

48. Msg, ORDAB-CR-34-8, ABMA to Chf, R&D, Da, 27 Aug 57, Hist Off files. 49. JUP-THOR ad hoc files; Hist of ABMA, Jul-Dec 57, pp. 6-8; JUP Chronology; all in Hist Off files.