Although the Army people realized that the integration of Navy requirements would incur same delay, nevertheless they knew that if these complex sea- based problems were not resolved, an unacceptable delay of shipboard application would occur. So, to gain Army goals in the long run, Navy problems were tackled, and by 1 September 1956 the over-all program was well adjusted and had a promise of being able to fire the first JUPITER-configured missile in January or February 1957. This was three months in advance of the original schedule. It was a strange turn of events, that during the first nine months of 1956 Army personnel were working on problems in navigation, ship motion, missile guidance, launching and handling, submarine application, and fuzing requirements. The Navy contributed its part, as well, especially in the nose cone recovery program. In this respect, they furnished a dummy missile under naval contract, and loaned a considerable amount of equipment to the program 39 . Withdrawal From Army Program The Navy was never particularly satisfied with a liquid- propelled IRBM because of the storage, handling, and launching problems involved. Inherently, liquid- propelled missiles, after ignition, rise from the launch ring much slower than solid propellant counterparts whose lift-off is nearly simultaneous with the firing command. Knowing these facts, the Navy sought very early to get a solid propellant version of the IRBM approved. On 20 March 1956, OSD-BMC began to consider the proposal, and early the next month the decision was forthcoming. The Navy was allowed to do a systems study to include component. This could involve propulsion flight testing as an aid toward determining weapon system feasibility. When the studies _____________________________

39. Ibid.; ABMA Final Rpt on Joint Army-Navy Aspects of JUP Dev Pro, c. Dec 56, Hist Off files.